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FOREWORD
Although the coal industry in Australia continues to expand and chase improvements in technology, equipment, training
and safety , the industry still suffers from underground incidents which have tragic consequences for individuals and
families. The responsibility is for all stakeholders, employers, employees and support agencies to remove causes and
behaviors which create such incidents. This will make underground coal mining safer for all personnel.
The fundamental mind set to safety perfomlance has changed dramatically over the last 15 years. During the early 1980's,
the recognition was made that the industry safety perfomlance was ve:ry poor. At the end of that decade and by the early
1990's many large companies, together with government and the unions were supporting safety training programs to
reduce Lost Time Injuries -the high level measure of safety. These programs produced varying levels of success, but
developed a sceptism amongst some parts of the industry where the reslllts were managed, not the risks.
A few incidents occurred in the early to mid 1990's which showed that the rate of change and the approaches to the
management of safety were not good enough. The industry started to look at Risk Management and the need to formally
quantify the risks, controls and protection to improve safety performan(;e.
The Wardens Inquiry into the accident at Moura No.2

in 1994 highlighted the need to review rescue operations for

personsunderground.
A coal industry committee, already set up to review the fundamentals of coal mines rescue, was given the task to review
escapeand rescue options by the Queensland Chief Inspector of Coal Mines. The committee consisted of a broad cross
section of major stakeholders of the NSW and Queensland coal industry .The process of review was fundamental,
exhaustive and widespread in its scope. It was clearly appreciated by all the committee members that escape and rescue
options for mine personnel could be substantially updated and improved. The mind set previously held, That mines rescue
was the calvary charging over the will to rescue people, needed to be changed in response to recent major incidents. This
change would encompassthe techniques, equipment, design of mines aJrldthe role of the rescue service.
The work has taken 2.5 years to get to this stage and will require the stakeholders in this industry to implement the
recommendations, complete R and D projects and participate in the infonnation sharing that will be necessary to sustain
theseimprovements. I would like to thank all those who have contributed including the sub committee participants. The
active involvement, participation and dedication of everyone, has recognised only the need to improve safety without the
barriers of state, political or industrial interference. It is encouraging to know that we can work together for the common
good when the need is greatest.

Mitch Jakeman
Chairman of Task Group 4
Developmentsin Self Escapeand Aided Rescue
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EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY AND RE(;OMMENDATIONS

The inquiry into the 1994 accident at Moura No.2 Colliery included in its findings that mine escape and rescue options for
persons in underground coal mines were in need of review. It recommended the establishment of industry working groups
to report to the Chief Inspector of Coal Mines (Qld) on matters including escape strategy and life support for escape from
mines.
Task Group No.4, comprising industry stakeholders from Qld and NSW, has examined issues relevant to escape and
rescue from Australian underground coal mines and formulated recoIIlIDendations and guidelines in response to the set
objectives and scope.
With regard to existing practice it was determined that:

•
•

for persons underground at the time of a major incident, escape options are limited and there is no consistent
strategy in place for rescue of mineworkers across the industry
filter self rescuershave a limited application in mine emergencies

•

knowledge of conditions underground after an accident is insufficient for accurate assessment of the mine
environment

•

rescue strategies require upgrading

The diversity of mine configurations and potential emergency scenarios led the Task Group to determine six (6) critical
issues:
Self escape
There is a primary need to enhance the capabilities of underground peI~ons to effect their own rescue -ie "self escape".
This is to be achieved by the provision of facilities in mines, training of mineworkers and management and the
development of generic and mine-specific escapestrategies.
Escape routes, alternative routes and facilities are to be planned, developed and equipped as part of Self Escape
Management Plans. An oxygen-based escape system is required with the following attributes:

•

all persons to wear self contained self rescuers;

•

replacement SCSR caches provided at suitably located changeover stations; and

•

use of refuge chambers where appropriate.

Communication introduction
A generic strategy is required to establish the location and condition of persons underground after an incident and to
maintain communication during aided rescue. The key areas requiring d,~velopment are:

•

guidance systemsfor self rescue;

•

communications post incident; and

•

detemlination of status of all personnel underground after an incident.

These will require technology transfer and some research. An industr:'I expert committee has been formed to champion
these initiatives.
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Gas management
Gas management guidelines are established for effective and safe in(:ident control. This should look at the design and
location of monitoring systems, the integrity and interpretation of information, mines rescue requirements for both
underground and to the surface and the training/competency of people ;rod systems.
Aided rescue
There is also scope for intervention, assistance and rescue of under~:round persons by surface personnel, i.e. -"aided
rescue". However, significant changes to rescue strategies are requiJred in order to make use of modern technology to
increase the chances of successful aided rescue. The determination of the status of conditions and personnel underground
are key areas requiring improvement. Rescue options and post incide:nt control strategies need to be appropriate for the
incident.
Areas that need to be researched and developed are a new mines rescu(~vehicle, consideration of large diameter boreholes
for rescue where appropriate, and the upgrade of environmental monitoring and communications equipment needed for
rescue teams.
Aided Rescue Management Plans are required at mines to ensure ttlat a coordinated and effectively-resourced rescue
response can be mounted in order to maximise the chances of saving persons trapped in a mine. Plans should address:

•

means to establish and monitor the status of persons undergroumd;

•

means to establish, monitor and assessconditions in the mine;

•

establishing post-incident controls;

•

rescue options; and

•

training for aided rescue

There is a clear need for the mines rescue services to revise their operating strategies and infrastructure to accommodate
the new ways of aiding rescue proposed by this report.
Incident

management

Provision of new escape and rescue systems will be of limited value unless the people in danger or participating in rescue
can make the appropriate decisions when confronted with an emergency situation. Planning, preparation and training for
such emergencies is essential to improving their chances of survival.
Incident Management allows those managing the incident to follow decision criteria to minimise risk and conduct a
successful emergency.

Training developments
Every underground mine should develop a Self Escape Management Plan as part of a Safety Management Plan to provide
all persons underground with the capability to reach a place of safety , recognising the difficult environmental conditions
following an incident. Training initiatives in the form of new generic tJraining resources and training guidelines should be
developed to support the use of these plans.
Specific recommendations aimed at improving capabilities in th(~se six critical areas have been made. These
recommendations promote the Task Group's proposed vision for respon:)e to incidents at mines in the future:
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All persons underground at the time of an incident shall be trained, equipped and able to
make an escape to the surface, or place of safety, if physically capable. Monitoring,
communications systems and other new rescue technok.gy will provide surface personnel
with the capability to safety deploy aided rescue measures to rescue those unable to selfescape.
Further development, prioritisation, management and funding of initiatives in this area require the continued involvement
of industry stakeholders. At the end of 1996 there were several urgent initiatives that could be quickly implemented by
industry to bring about improvements in emergency escape and rescue.
The specific recommendations of the Moura No.2 Warden's Report Implementation, Task Group 4 Report (1996) are
listed below.
Recommendation

1

Every underground mine should develop a Self Escape Management Plan and an Aided Rescue Management Plan. The
interrelationship between the Escape and Rescue Plans must be e"amined and incorporated into the Mine Safety
Management Plan.
Recommendation

a)

2

A generic industry training resource package for self escape and aided rescue should be developed.

b) Guidelines for mine specific training

Recommendation

in self escape and aided res<:ue should be developed,

3

Every underground mine should establish an escapeway from all parts of the mine to the surface or to an alternative place
of safety. A detailed risk analysis of proposed escapeways will need to be undertaken and strategies developed to control
risks.
Recommendation

4

From each part of every underground
escape to the surface or an alternative

mine, there should be at least one route, other than an escapeway, which enable self
place of safety. A conveyor roadway or a return roadway are not precluded for this

purpose.

Recommendation

5

An oxygen-based self escape system should be provided for all persons underground.
Recommendation

6

Each person underground should be equipped with, and carry on their person at all times, a self contained self rescuer
(SCSR).
Recommendation

7

An industry committee/forum (technical experts and operators) should be established to coordinate the advancement of
capabilities to alert, to communicate with, and to assessthe status of underground persons during a mine emergency.
Recommendation

COAL98

8

Conference

Wollongong

18.20

February

1998

726

Fixed tube bundles and gas chromatographs should be made available at all mines as the primary method of measuring
post incident mine atmospheric conditions.
Recommendation

9

Research into the development of robust telemetric sensors for gas analysis and other environmental parameters, over the
ranges existing after incidents, should be prioritised.
Recommendation 10
A mine emergency reconnaissance vehicle should be made available fo,r all mines for use in emergencies.

Recommendation 11
Both pre-installed and post-incident boreholes should be considered when developing Aided Rescue Management Plans.
Recommendation 12
Rescueteams should be provided with state of the art environmental monitoring equipment and on-line communications

Recommendation 13
Equipment should be made available to asc~rtain the physical status of the mine environment {including temperature,
humidity, pressure etc) using boreholes, and reconnaissance vehicles.
Recommendation 14
A demonstration of the capabilities of microseismic monitoring technology to detect, locate and monitor roof falls,
outbursts and fires should be carried out.
Recommendation

J 5

The capability to model ventilation and the mine environment followin!~ an incident should be available at mines.
Recommendation 16
Guidelines, common to both Qld and NSW, should be developed for integrated emergency preparedness involving mine
operators and emergency services.
Recommendation 17
Industry should develop an effective computer-based emergency decision support system for incident management and
training.
Recommendation 18
A steering committee should be established to encourage and oversee the development of emergency rescue vehicles.
Recommendation 19
Mines should consider the need for refuge chambers when developing Self Escape and Aided Rescue Management Plans.
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Recommendation

20

Aided rescue using shafts and/or large diameter boreholes should be considered for inclusion in mines Aided Rescue
Management Plans where viable.

Recommendation 21
.

A

generic

industry

mineworkers

training

resource

package

for

self

escape

and

aided

rescue

should

be

developed

for

and management/others.

Status of Recommendations -1 January 1998.
I Recommendation 1
Recommendation 2a, 2b

M7;islated
Likely to bc~ a six month

development

process during

1998.
Recommendation

3

Recommendation

4

within
each mine's
management plan
within
each mine's

Accommodated
~~~on-t~~ard
Accommod~lted

I Recommendation6

evacua!i9J11L~ardmanag~me~t ~l~.
Legislated in Queensland, pending
necessarily oxygen based).
Legislated in Queensland

I Recommendation

7
--

Have

Recommendation

8

Recommendation

5

~et

t~,ice

-will

in

9

Recommendation

10

emergency

NSW

(not
-

continue-tQ-~

Not Legislalted -chromatographs

are in place at all Qld

mines
Recommendation

emergency

~-

Research nc,t pioritised -mentioned in gas management
guidelines ..requires further thought for promoting
research
I In

place

-NUMBAT

I Guidelines

~ Recommenda!!Q!ill

~ Recommendation

I Dealt ~~.e:as

12

Recommendation 13

Reconnaissamce
equipmen-t-3vailable

I Recommendation

manag~
vehicle

guidelines

-work

proceeding

borehole

for Q!!!~~e

ResearcQpl@~
Needs to be proactively energised -C. Mallet to follow

14

Recommendation 15

UP-

--

Recommendation 16

) ~uidelines

Recommendation

17 .

J-.B-.~c.<:>mmendations
for R@dD-~g

Recommendation

18

Done

Recommendation

19

Done

~g~~

develo~

In progre~s-

! Recommendation

20

I Recommendation

21a.

I Six montltQrQ.iect
for development1998.

2~

In conclusion, many of these recommendation have been actioned throughout the industry through legislative
amendments, the development of Safety Mangement Plans, changes to the Mines Rescue Services and further development
of research projects. The aim is to continue our focus on Risk Managc~mentand not become complacent with improving
results. The potential risks in mining like mother nature are unforgiving and severely penalise those that become
neglectful.
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INTRODUCTION
The Warden's Inquiry into the Moura No.2 incident contained a number of findings and recommendations aimed at
reducing the likelihood of future accidents. Some of the recomrnendati,Dnscalled for further investigation, analysis and the
development of safe operating guidelines. Several Task Groups, representing various industry stakeholders, were
subsequently assembled comprising members with relevant experience and skills to determine the required guidelines and
report back to the Chief Inspector of Coal Mines (Qld).
Five such Task Groups were convened, with Task Group No.4 a11ottt~dthe task of developing guidelines in response to
Recommendations 9 and 10 of the Warden's Report. These related to 'the development of an Escape Strategy for persons
involved in an incident.
An industry panel with suitable membership had been previously form(:d to develop and industry plan for enhanced mines
rescue following an industry forum which considered the future of th(: "NUMBA T" remote underground reconnaissance
vehicle. This committee was allotted the additional specific tasks requil"ed of Task Group No.4.
This report presents the recommendations of Task Group No.4 for consideration by the Chief Inspector, and the industry
in general.

OBJECTIVES
The specific objectives for Task Group No.4 were:

1.

To recommend guidelines to the Chief Inspector of Coal Mine~, {Qld) on self rescue escape;

2.

To present a report to the Chief Inspector of Coal Mines (Qld) addressing issues identified in Recommendations 9
and 10 of the Moura No.2 Wardens Report.

These recommendations were as follows:
Recommendation

"

9

it is recommended that a representative industry working party, containing appropriate expertise, be convened

by the Chief Inspector of Coal Mines and that group be charged with the development of guidelines for the industry
covering life support for escape."

Recommendation 10
"

it is recommended that the Chief Inspector of Coal Mines se:t up a working party, comprising persons with

appropriate knowledge and experience, to examine and report on a rangt~of issues relating to emergency escapefacilities.
The group should investigate means whereby persons in any part of a mine, who are subject to disorientation or severely
impaired visibility , are able to find their way out of the mine. Consideration should also be given by the group to the
potential role for motorised transport in emergency escape arrangements."

SCOPE
The scope of the study by Task Group No.4 was established as follows:

1.
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2.

to develop guidelines for the establishment and use at underground coal mines of an appropriate self escape
system from all underground work areas which is independent of external or mechanised emergency support
systems;

3.

to develop recommendations leading to an effective aided rescue system for underground coal mines;
to prepare a report addressing issues identified in Recommendations 9 and 10 of the Moura No.2
Report, for presentation to the Chief Inspector of Coal Mines (C~ld),by 28 June, 1996.

5.

Warden's

prepare a report to develop guidelines for self escape, gas management, incident management and establish
training competencies and establish research projects for communication and aided rescue by Jan I, 1998.

The report is to address a broad range of issues relating to emergency escape facilities at a coal mine. Subjects to be
addressed should include:

•

assistanceto visually impaired or disoriented person;

•

potential for powered emergency transport

•

use of large diameter drill holes and possible emergency re,covery routes

•

rescue chambers or self contained life support refuges;

•

use of designated escapewaysas part of the mine design;

•

communications options to detennine the status of person underground

•

identification of any limitations on the dimensions and operating range of emergency vehicles

•

identification of the maximum distance an emergency vehicle may have to travel in any Queensland
underground coal mine (currently operating) within the ne"t 15 years.

The committee's focus spans from immediately after the initiation of an emergency incident up until the time that all
personnel have been recovered from the mine, or when the emergency I::ontrol team has determined that the emergency is
over. The retrieval of any bodies, obtaining of evidence or recovering the mine are not considered emergency activities
and should be conducted as a pre-planned operation using a risk management approach.

DEVELOPMENT

OF ST]l:tATEGY

The Task Group has considered the post incident response issues in the I::ontext of the structure illustrated in the flow chart
below (Fig 5.1). This flowchart tracks the development of an emerg:ency from the incident until the mine returns to
operational status or closure. It also recognises that in order to effectively prepare for incident response, management
plans, rescue facilities and training need to be put in place. The critical c~lementsof this process studied by the Task Group
are the Self Escape and Aided Rescue components as well as aspectsof ]pre-incident preparation.
Table 4,
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Fig 4.1 Incident Response

Table 4. Escape and Rescue Strat.~gy -Core Issues

Escape

Guidelines

Routes

Equipment

II

Communications

Routine monitorin

II

Location

Post incident
monitorin

Condition

Reconnaissance
Vehicle

infrastructure design

Competency

Ventilation

t

Sealin~

Refuge

Environment

,

lnertisation

Chambers

Re-entry

~~bers
Refuge Chambers

interpretation

Compe~x
The issues have been broadly categorised into those covering escape strategy, personnel status, environmental conditions,
control strategy and rescue options. Several of the issues overlap these categories as addressed in the detailed sections of
the report. Some issues have been extensively dealt with by other ta:sk groups (e.g. seals, inertisation, re-entry) and are
listed here only for completeness.
The Task Group adopted an integrated systems approach to escape and rescue which resulted in a number of
recommendations which will require prioritised implementation.
Several recommendations require research and
development, or embody training initiatives, some require a legislative response, and most require further industry
collaboration. It is recognised that until all of the elements identified are available, the recommended system may not
achieve its full potential.
It was also recognised that individual mines may develop specific pl;ans that are subsets of a total rescue system. It is
therefore up to individual operations to identify, develop and implement rescue systems appropriate for their needs in
conjunction with relevant stakeholders. It is vital, however that the industry adopts a uniform approach to the upgrading of
escapeand rescue strategies in order to maximise the potential for incident survival and response.
Strategy development was considered for current as well as future coal mine scenarios. In looking ahead, it was
considered impractical to forecast the nature of coal mine layouts, size: and operating environments beyond 5 to 10 years,
during which time similar characteristics to those in existence today ~mdexisting mines will simply increase in area and
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distance from surface entries. Some may add man-winding shafts. It is expected that escape and rescue strategies
developed today will be continuously reviewed and amended to maintain relevance.

SELF ESCAPE -EMERGENCY

E:SCAPE SYSTEMS

Introduction

Issues relevant to self-escape from Australian underground coalmine!; have been examined and recommendations and
guidelines formulated in response to the terms of reference and scope for Task Group 4. The issues relate to the
implementation of Task Group 4 recommendations 1, 2a, 3, 4, 5, 6, 19, :~Ia, 21b (see pp 10-12).
Self Escape -Emergency Escape Systems, covers the major points arising from the work of both the Queensland and New
South Wales working groups, and the results of a study of overseas escape strategies that was undertaken by the NSW
working group.
W. Barraclough, BHP Coal
R. Bancroft, Dept Minerals and Energy Qld
P. Eade, BHP Coal
G. Dwyer, United Mineworker's Union
G. Fawcett, Dept Mineral Resources
G. MacDonald, Dept of Mineral Resources
P. MacKenzie- Wood, Mines Rescue Service NSW
F. O'Connor, Appin Colliery

Escapestrategy
Evaluation of the various factors involved identified a number of nrlajor elements that need to be addressed in the
development of an emergency escapesystem that enables persons to escape safely.
Some of these elements are:

•

Early Warning;

•

Self RescueApparatus;

.Communications'
.Guidance

Systems I Lifelines:

•

Escapeways I Transport;

•

Refuge Chambers I Changeover Stations;

•

Training of personnel; and

•

Safety Management Plan for Evacuation,

The escape of persons underground will be enhanced by the use o1' a planned strategy that has been developed by
consideration of these elements and recognition of the potentially difficult circumstances a person could encounter
following an incident. Importantly the strategy will include the realisatilon that the mobilisation of rescue personnel could
take time. The initial reactions of persons underground to an incident situation are a significant determinant on their
survival. Planning, preparation and training for such emergencies are essential components required to improving their
likelihood of survival.
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Early warning
The role of an early warning system is to sense the fIrst signs of fu"e or explosion and communicate an alarm so that
evacuation of the mine or part can take place. Control measures takl~n at the earliest possible time would allow egress
through reasonably smoke free escapeways and maximise effective escape.
Carbon Monoxide and smoke sensing systems offer considerable pote:ntial for early and more reliable fIfe detection than
do other available systems.
A control system must be established to receive and analyse data on the underground environment. The system must
include decision making protocols and enable control to be maintained and action to be coordinated during an emergency.
Consideration should be given to the incorporation of a communicatilJn system throughout the mine that can be used to
immediately notify underground employees in all areas of the mine o1[the need to evacuate. The system should have the
ability to provide employees with incident details and directions. Principal systems include telephone, traditional two-way
radio, ground induction and leaky feeders.
Western Australian, Canadian and Mount Isa Mines metalliferous mines have introduced systems to release stench gas to
the ventilation system to initiate emergency procedures.
Computer generated emergency alert systems are available where recorded messages can be transmitted to localities on an
"at risk" basis. The Revmaux (HBL) mine in France utilises such a sy!;tem with a maximum of 10 localities alerted at one
time. An alert immediately triggers the escape procedure. A similar type of system has been used in a Queensland colliery .

The Personal Emergency Device referred to as "FED through the earth system" is capable of sending radio messages from
the surface to wearers of receiving units on a mine-wide basis after an iJllcident. The FED's utility is limited by the inability
to return signals from the wearer to the surface. Medium frequency jpartially inductive systems (eg Rim tech, Taiheiyo)
provide increased potential for survival after an incident because of the robust nature of the wave carriers used (pipes,
cables etc.). Prototype units for locating trapped miners have been developed overseas but their application is limited to
short range, direct line of sight and restrictive circumstances.

Self rescuers
Filter type self rescuers were introduced into the coal mining industry in the 1960' s in response to many fatalities that had
arisen due to conveyor belt fIfes (e.g. Creswell Colliery, UK, 1950- 80 fatalities). They are only effective where sufficient
oxygen is present in the atmosphere.
The introduction of fIre resistant anti-static conveyor belts, fIre resistanl: oils, reduced use of timber supports and improved
environmental monitoring technology has reduced the risk of mine fIre!; and hence the principal reason for the use of filter
type self-rescuers.
An explosion occurring in the vicinity of a working face is now the p,rincipal hazard that may require the use of a selfrescuer.
In reviewing previous explosion incidents, it was found that due to the reduced oxygen content of parts of the mine
atmospherefollowing explosions, the use of a filter type rescuer would Jl1othave enabled persons to escape.
For this reason, it is considered essential that all persons underground be equipped with a self-contained self-rescuer
(SCSR), ie a self-rescuer that provides the wearer with respirable air.
There are many brands and types of SCSR' s currently available. These ~lremainly manufactured in either Europe, the USA
or South Africa, each country having different testing and approval c:riteria. The only international standard currently
available for the testing of chemical type (KOJ oxygen self-rescuers i~i EN 401 (B.S., 1993). The testing of compressed
oxygen self-rescuers in Australia is covered by AS/NZ 1716 (DMR, 19~'6).
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Because of the differing test criteria used, and the confusion that this can create when evaluating different brands, EN 401
has been recommended as the standard for the testing of chemical oJ(ygen SCSR's. EN 401 is being adopted until an
Australian standard is developed.
Immediately following an underground mine explosion, visibility can be significantly reduced causing irritation to eyesin
smoke laden atmospheres. This impairs the self-escape of persons who (:an become disoriented. Combined with the lack of
communication, serious limitations are placed on the ability to effect escape.
South African research and experience with chemical oxygen SCSRs hlls shown that poor visibility and disorientation can
reduce the distance traveled to 60% of that expected under normal conditions.
Many cases have been cited where persons have not been able to find their self-contained self-rescuer immediately
adjacent to them (DMR, 1996).
Due to this disorientation and lack of visibility , it is essential that all pt:ople underground carry an SCSR with them at all
times.
Another factor that can playa major part in the escape of persons using self-rescuers is body mass. This subject is dealt
with comprehensively by Paul Mackenzie Wood in his paper "Deploym,~nt of self-contained self-rescuers in coal mines"
There is a requirement in all Australian underground coaImines for the use of approved self rescuers. The minimum
requirement in NSW is for filter type self-rescuers and from January 1 1998 se1f-contained oxygen self-rescuers have been
required in Queensland.
Communications
There is a need for a communications system that would survive an incident and provide ongoing two-way
communications between escaping or trapped miners and rescue personnel on the surface. The system should be
compatible with the type of self-rescue breathing apparatus to be used ~mdthe likely escape or refuge options available to
survivors. As power to the mine is likely to be interrupted during all incident, self-contained battery powered backup
should be integral to the system. Whilst voice is the highest priority for transfer, systems which can also transmit data and
video signals should be encouraged to assist the rescue process.
The minimum coverage requirement is for a communication system to be established along escape routes.
The location and tracking of all persons (and most vehicles) in underground mines should also be considered in any escape
system. Effective two-way voice communication will contribute to this requirement but more efficient electronic systems
should be pursued.
Current communications systems for underground mines are limited for emergency conditions but there are commercial
leaky feeder based systems which have good potential provided that Itransmission networks can be stiffened to survive
incidents or equipoped with satisfactory redundancy. Low frequency "through the earth" technology is being researched
for underground-to-surface capability .Once robust networks can be demonstrated, value-adding technology such as
personnel and vehicle tracking and personnel status monitoring can b,~ deployed. Management plans must embrace the
support of such communication systems and link into emergency protocols and controls.
Escapeways

Rescue response following an incident involves a period of time that, in most circumstances, requires people underground
to attempt an organised escape, rather than await rescue. In Australian c:ollieries, the distance from the working face to the
surface can be considerable, and in many cases the seam grade can be quite steep. These escape route difficulties, allied
with the expected problems of disorientation and poor visibility , give rise to a requirement for a roadway to be established
in each mine that meets the criteria of good trafficability.

COAL98

Conference

WoUongong

18- 20 February

1998

734

This roadway should, as far as practicable, be capable of maintaining a respirable atmosphere that is free from fumes and
airborne dust, after an explosion or fIfe. To achieve this, the escape'Nay should be an intake airway and protected from
damage by being segregated from other roadways with stoppings capable of withstanding low intensity explosions.
Vehicular escape would, in most circumstances, afford the best chance of persons making a rapid escape from the mine,
and escapeways should be designed to maxirnise the likelihood of j'acilitating vehicular escape, without precluding or
endangering passageby foot.
Guidance systems
To assist in gaining access to escapeways,and in guiding persons alOlrlgescapeways in conditions of low visibility , clear
guidance systems that will survive an incident are required. Knotted ropes with directional cones fitted (lifelines) have
been developed for this purpose. More recently, battery-powered guidance systems, such as the "MOSES" system in
South Africa and "LEADLIGHT" in Australia incorporating directionally discriminating audible pitches and flashing
LED's have been developed to provide clearer guidance. The Australian system is also developing a tracking tag system
which can be integrated or stand alone to determine where personnel are in the escapeways or mine workings.
Use of the term "second means of egress" is commonly applied to return airways, with little thought being given to which
is the most desirable escape route. In emergency exercises involving different scenarios, employees invariably attempted
to escape via the returns, even when this may have been the most inappropriate route. The concept of "second means of
egress" as the primary escape route should be replaced by the concept of an "escapeway".
Mine management should carefully consider which airway would makf~ the most suitable escapeway. Because of the need
to maintain a respirable atmosphere, the risk of lIre in this roadway should be reduced to a minimum. This could be
achieved by restricting the use of equipment in this roadway to those items that are either fitted with fire suppression
devices, or which incorporate a fail safe system to prevent the outbreak of fire.

Change-overstBtions
Dependant upon the distance of the working areas from the surface and the duration of any self contained self-rescuers
(SCSRs) to be carried, the provision of underground caches of SCSRs must be considered to facilitate the escape of
persons to the surface. The number and separation distance between ,cachesshould be based on the assumption that the
mine atmosphere is irrespirable all of the way to the surface, and that visibility throughout the mine will be very poor.
Caches installed throughout a mine should be constructed so that they are protected from the effects of low intensity
explosions. Persons exchanging SCSR's should be able to do so in a s.afemanner. This could be accomplished by being
able to exchange SCSR' s in irrespirable atmospheres or by the provision of changeover stations equipped with respirable
air. Consideration should also be given to equipping changeover stations with communication facilities, capable of
surviving an incident, to facilitate escapeco-ordination.
In addition to designated caches located at strategic locations in the mine, consideration should be given to the provision of
either a cache of SCSR's or some other system of respirable air, on board personnel vehicles. There are compressed air
systems now available, comprising a storage cylinders and a numbe:r of face masks connected to a common supply
regulator, that could meet this need.
Refuge chambers
Refuge chambers have an accepted place in rescue strategies in South African coalmines where workers are instructed to
make their way to the section refuge chamber. This is mainly due tCIthe large areal extent of the mine workings. the
generally shallow depth of workings (enabling borehole recovery in the event of a disaster) and the differing cultural
backgrounds and experience of the mine workers.
The majority of opinions sought on the use of refuge chambers in A.ustralian coalmines indicates that Australian coal
miners, in the absence of incident information, would attempt to reach the mine surface rather than stay underground in a
Refuge Chamber.
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In the first instance, escape systems should be provided to enable persons to escape to the surface of the mine or alternative
place of safety. Operators should, however, examine their own cirCUm!itancesand possible scenarios to ascertain whether
or not there is a place for refuge chambers in their Self Escape Management Plan.
Current thinking indicates that it is very unlikely that rescue teams will be sent into a mine with explosive or toxic
concentrations of gas, and that miners will generally need to effect their own rescue.
For this reason it is believed that regardless of whether a Refuge Chamb,~ror a Change Over Station is used, the system
should be mainly designed so that miners have a safe place to assemble.
The Refuge Chamber or Change Over Station should preferably be supplied with a respirable atmosphere and means of
communication to the surface so that people can plan their escape and change from one self rescuer to another in safety.
While the system may be best designed to provide assistance to a safe and timely escape, it needs to be recognised that
there may be injured persons that are unable to escape from the mine, but may be able to reach a place of safety if one is
provided.

Training
Provision of oxygen self-rescuers, early warning systems and escapeways will be of limited value unless the people
attempting escape can make the appropriate decisions when confronted with an emergency situation. It is essential that all
mineworkers be given adequateand regular training in all aspects of the mine escape system.
Training exercises should entail more than just travelling through the sec:ondmeans of egress or escapeway.
A feature of both USA and South African mineworker training is participation in regular evacuation exercises, often under
simulated conditions of disorientation or low visibility.

Evacuation management plan
Consideration of all the various aspects of the mine when examined in the light of the previously enumerated factors
should be incorporated into a mine evacuation or Self-Escape Managem,~ntPlan.
The plan should be developed using the criteria established in guidelines for Queensland Safety Management Plans or the
New South Wales Risk Management handbook for the Mining Industry "MDG 1010.
This would provide all persons underground with the capability to reach a place of safety , recognising the difficult
environmental conditions likely to be encountered following an underground incident.
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COMMUNICAnONS

-RESEARCH

and DEVELOP:MENT

PROJECTS

The task group concluded that communications following underground incidents could be enhanced through several
initiatives some of which required demonstration and some which required further research and development.
The communication sub-committee was:
B. Roberston (Chair), Shell Coal Pty Ltd
J. Ruble, Moranbah North
T. Hancock, Moranbah North
G. Baton, BHP Colleries
T. Willmott, Dartbrook Mine
D. Decker, CSIRO
J. Jacka, CSIRO
R. Wischusen, AMIRA
D. Pomfret, Power Coal
The recommendations and actions were:

•

Develop alert/a1arrn systems -options to be considered and consolidated

•

Investigate

•

Develop robust telephone nodes -cooperate with suppliers to demonstrate

•

Test escapeway medium frequency

•

Reinforce

•

Demonstrate

•

Facilitate communication between employees -evaluate options with SCSR manufacturers

•

Develop distress beacons -review

•

Establish protocols -for

•

Develop vital signs monitoring

"reverse PED" concept -develop

mine-wide

inductive

research proposal

systems -trials

radio networks -trials

tracking -trials

prototypes, develop research projects if feasible

industry panel
-source

transducers, trial

An industry committee/forum was established to examine each of these recommendations and propose action plans for
implementation. The committee determined that:

•

Traditional alert/alarm systems were not ideal for coal mines but that a satisfactory full time radio-based
communications system would satisfy this need.

•

A "through-the-earth" radio system which allowed messagesto be sent from underground to surface was highly
desirable and potentially feasible but required significant development. An ACARP grant was made to CSIRO
Division of Radiophysics to develop such technology.

•

Reinforcement of telephone and radio systems through installation of redundant links to surface via boreholes was
seen as a viable strategy and trials were to be encouraged. CSIRO is developing a cellular system of low cost
radio repeaters which provides improved redundancy and reliability by virtue of overlapping cells.
MF inductive radio systems suffer from voice quality and range but may be usefully deployed in emergency
escapeways. Suitable manufacturers should be encouraged to demonstrate capabilities.
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•

Tracking of personnel and equipment was commercially
Demonstrations would be forthcoming.

available but depended on network reliability.

It was necessary to consider how escaping persons could effectively communicate with each other when wearing SCSRs.
This was an issue for consideration by manufacturers and mine managers, but should await establishment of satisfactory
escapemanagement plans and equipment.
Distress beacons were desirable and some prototypes of limited range are available overseas The application of radiobased tracking transducers should encompass this requirement
Protocols were not required.
Vital signs transducers exist in the medical/surveillance industries and could readily be deployed underground, given
robust networks
It was observed that the underground metalliferous industry was more advanced in communications than was coal and that
much could be learned from this experience.

GAS MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES
Introduction
The Underground Mines Rescue Strategy Development group selected a gas management sub-committee to look at the gas
management information required in an emergency and how it is to be provided. This request was related to the
implementation of Task Group 4 recommendations 8,9 andl2 (see pp 10- 12).
8.

Fixed tube bundles and gas chromatographs should be made available at all mines as the primary method of
measuring post incident mine atmospheric conditions. (Plans, RandD and legislation).

9.

Research into the development of robust telemetric sensors for gas analysis and other environmental parameters,
over the ranges existing after incidents, should be prioritised (RandD).

12.

Rescue teams should be provided
communications

with state of the art environmental

monitoring

equipment

and on-line

(RandD).

The gas management sub-committee had the following membership:
PMackenzie-Wood
(Chair), Mines Rescue Service, NSW
D Kerr, Queensland Mines Rescue Brigade
R Moreby, Dartbrook Coal
D Cliff, Simtars
W Allison, CFMEU, Queensland Branch
W Price, Crinum Mine
G Fawcett, Dept Mineral Resources, NSW

Terms of reference
1.

To prepare guidance material that identifies available systems that will provide adequate information on gases for
the effective and safe control of an incident.

2.

To identify research and development requirements to enhance the adequacy of gas management systems in an
emergency.
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A vailability of critical information
.Design
criteria for monitoring

systems

•

Location of monitoring points

•

Integrity of information

•

Data management (software)

•

Interpretation

Mines Rescue requirement

•

Underground personal gas monitoring

•

Communication

•

Environmental team to FAB

surface to F AB team

Training/competency

•

Control room persons

•

Monitoring

•

Refresher

•

Sampling

•

Boreholes

system

Documentation

•

Records

•

Management

Matrix

system

1

Comparison of monitoring

.

Matrix

•
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OBJECTIVE:

Availability of
critical information

To provide adequateinformation on gasesduring normal operations, during an incident
and after an incident to
enable effective and safeincident control.

Design criteria for.
monitoring.
systems

Comparison of systems -See Matrix
Redundancy of monitoring
-Tubes
.Continuity
-Power

1 (page 8)

and sensors in same location
of information
backup (uninterrupted

power supply

generator)
-Boreholes
as additional sampling points
-Utilisation
of exploratory boreholes
.Robust
(surface to underground) monitoring
integrity of post incident information
-Fire resistant (self extinguishing)
-Explosion
-Boreholes

-battery

or

points to enhance the

resistant (protected, secured)
may offer protection

.Mobile
monitoring systems (NUMBAT) to gain information
from additional locations
.Concentration
ranges
-Avoid range switching at critical concentrations
eg 5% CH4 and 15% CH4
-High range capability -dual systems such as tube bundle
and gas chromatograph
eg 100% CH4
-High range methods and standards to be maintained
.Gases
-CO, CH4, O2, C02 and velocity -essential
-H2, C2H4-capability
.Other
information
-Transducer for velocity , temperature and differential pressure
at appropriate locations
.Accuracy,
reliability
-Infrastructure to support calibration and maintenance to
include documented procedures and Australian Standard,
trained staff, range of calibration standards for all gases
to cover all ranges
Third party calibration audit, participation in post incident
correlation and cross-sensitivity exercises
-Consider pressure testing of tubes for leaks
-Consider cross-sensitivity of IR CO analyser to C02, N2O
and ~o, the CO electrochemical cell to H2, ~S, higher
hydrocarbons and the catalytic sensor to CO, ~, low O2
and poisons
Note: N2O has been found in the goaf of a number of
collieries and is thought to originate from adjacent open
cut operations and is a by-product from the use of
explosives
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.Fully
supported by supplier
.Availability
of external expert assistance
.Remote
access(modem I e-mail)
~-Remote
Interpretation

.Availability

Mines Rescue

Underground

-Experience
-Qualification
-Training
.Gases

requirement

personal

gas

monitoring

vie~g

--.

of sufficient

numbers of competent

people

-02' CO and total combustibles (CH4 + H2 + CO) on a
0-100% LEL output, C02, ~S
.2
multigas instruments per team
.Defeated

or manipulated

alarms and identifiable

from normal mining

instruments
.Data
logging and down loading capability
.Protection
from radio frequency
.Other
information

interference

-Temperature
-Relative
h~!I-1i~i!Y--

Communication
surface -FAR team

.Rely
on in-mine communications (telephones, DAC, PED)
.Personal
inductive radios
.Multistrand
aerial (carried and doubles as lifeline)
.Research
requirement
-To make existing communication more robust, flexible,
safe to use
-Fibre
optic cable for digital radio transmission, video
(helmet cam)
-Reverse
Ped to include transmission
environmental dat~ --

Environmental
team -FAR

.Psychrometer
.Anemometer
.Velometer
.Research

of gas and other

(temperature and humidity)
(M3/sec)
(M/sec)
requirement

-Intrinsically
safe, direct read out of temperature,
velocity and quantity
-I.R. thermography

humidity,

-Sonar
Training /
Competency

Control room
persons

.Underground
experience at least equivalent to that required to obtain a
current deputy certificate
.Advanced
fIrst-aid I life support
.Normal
background levels, action trigger levels and action plans
.Competency
in modules from an accredited course dealing with:
-Emergency escapeplans, location of caches
-Emergency response plans
-Principal management hazard plans
-Familiarisation with underground operations
-Mine gasesI detection I monitoring I sampling
-Principles of mine ventilation
-Spontaneouscombustion
-Mine fIfes I explosions
-Interpretation of associated gas mixtures
.-Communication
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~

.Sufficient
competent people on site to operate, calibrate and maintain
system to ensure continuous relevant data is available when required and

Monitoring
system

in~~lQ~at
reg~-.Industry
standards
.Challenge
testing commensurate with frequency of exposure to
procedures and technology
.Simulations
to review adequacy of action plans
.Use of pre-instaIled boreholes
.Emissions
from rider seams
.Effect
of underground and surface pressure changes on inward I
outwards breathing
.Effect
of stratification of gases
.Difficulties
with precise location of sample line end
.Research requirements
-Better reliability of drilling location
-Method to precisely determine the location of the end of
the sample line.

Refresher

Sampling

Boreholes

Documentation

Records

.Archiving
.Average

for discrete samples (eg skipping to every Slhpoint?)

.Training

I competencies

.Calibration
I maintenance
.Date
of purchase I installation
.! --Duty cards I resource list (people. materials. suppo~)-.Procedures

Management
system

.Roles

and responsibilities

.Audits
.Review
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Matrix

1 -Comparison

.No

explosion proof
instruments required
.Easier
maintenance
.No
underground power

Advantages

.Results
in real time
.Long
distances:are
possible with some types
.Sensor failure is

requirements
.Wide
range of gases
.Instruments
can be calibrated
on the surface
.Readily
attach additional
instruments, mobile
laboratory or gas
ch!Qmato1!;raph
.Results
not in real time
.Leaks
are not immediately

Disadvantages

apparent
.Condensation
in tubes
.Faults
not immediately
apparent
.Tubes
may be damaged in an
explosion
.Cross sensitivity of CO IR
cell

of moniltoring system

immediately recognised

.High
maintenalllce
.Limited
carbon
monoxide senslorrange
(0.2%)
.Limited
sensors (limited
for carbon dioxide /
none for hydrogen)
.Poisoning
of methane
sensor
.In
situ calibration
.Cross
sensitivity of CO
sensor
.Loss
of power ~:eg>
1.25% methane)
.Limited
sensor life (1-2
years)
.Unsuitable

.Complete
analysis
.No
cross sensitivity
.Capable
of measuring hydrogen
.Capable
of measuring ethylene
and higher hydrocarbons
.Wide
measuring range

.Relatively
slow speed of analysis
with some systems
.High
maintenance
.Complex
controls
.Requires
expert attention
.Regular
calibration
.High
CH4 concentrations may
interfere with low level CO
measurements
.Requires
discrete samples

in low

oxygen atmospheres
(behind seals)
.Impedance
loss in cables
can occur with some
-!y~es
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AIDED RESCUE
Introduction

The issues relevant to Aided Rescue from underground mines have been examined to look at the equipment, systems,
training and research projects that need to be considered. Recommendations and guidelines have been fonnulated with
reference to Task Group 4 recommendations 1, 10, 11,12,13,18,19,20. The Aided Rescue sub-committee included
A. Sellars (Chair), Queensland Mines Rescue
M. Downs, BHP Coal
C. Mallett, CSIRO
I. Tapp, CFMEU NSW
B. Lyne, DME Qld

Terms of reference
.

•

To prepare guidance material that identifies available systems and their limitations so that adequateprovision may
be considered in the design of mines or the development of a mines Hazard Management Plan.
To identify research and development requirements on refuge chambers, microseismic detection systems, large
diameter drilling and rescue emergency vehicles.

Refuge chambers used in underground mining
General background
The use of Refuge Chambers as a critical part of an underground rescue strategy is applied in both coal and metalliferous
mines in the Republic of South Africa (RSA). There are also limited nulnbers of refuge chambers in use in coal mines in
Australia and the United States of America, these being apparently less integrated into an overall escapestrategy.
It is worthwhile noting that the South Africans have "operational" experience in the use of such chambers.
Discussions with Australian industry personnel who have recently und,ertakena study tour of overseas mines and mining
safety and research establishments, indicates that the concept of the rescue chamber is embodied in both statutory and
operation aspectsof South African mines.
It must be stressed that the Rescue Chamber concept is a part of an overall strategy involving self contained breathing
apparatus, guidance systems, site infrastructure, chamber provisions and recovery methods. The Refuge Chamber is not
considered a "stand alone" item.
Well developed management schemes are in place in the RSA, covering chamber inspections, placement of chambers
relative to working faces, chamber facilities/provisions, associated infrastructure and training/practice schedules.
There are two basic forms of rescue chamber, these being either a portable chamber, or a static chamber, built in and
limited to, a particular site in the mine. In Australia, a portable chamber design is marketed by MSA, whilst information
from the RSA indicates the development of a relatively sophisticated portable design is reasonably advanced.
Static chambers are of myriad designs, each particular design being tailored to specific sites or applications. Experience in
South Africa indicates that chambers should be built in "blind ends", ie not in redundant cut-throughs or between
ventilation splits.
It is plausible to envisage a variety of construction methods being acceptable in the case of a static chamber, encompassing
steel bulkheads, grout walls, block walls, etc.
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Key points of overall strategy
The use of refuge chambers is predicted on the basis that:

•

emergency egress to the surface is either prevented or is relatively more dangerous.

•

entry to the refuge chamber can be achieved in emergency conclitions.

•

personnel can be sustained in the chamber pending rescue.

•

personnel recovery from the chamber can be effected in a timely manner, either by stabilising external mine
conditions to suit self egress, or by specialist teams equipped with self-contained breathing apparatus.

Each of the strategic factors above prompts a set of conditions or re:quirements that must be in place for the refuge
chamber principle to be effective. The concept of the refuge chamber is unlikely to work in isolation.
System requirements
Significant training will be needed to gain behavioural acceptance of the refuge chamber as a "muster point" in case of an
emergency, rather than "bolting for the surface".
Guidance systems such as cone/lanyard ropes and audio visual systems are required to enable the refuge chamber to be
reached under conditions of extremely poor visibility, disorientation, confusion and shock.
Chamber location guidance will be a key feature, to promote the ease of access to personnel with limited travelling
capabilities due to capacity limitations with self-contained breathing apparatus.
Refuge chambers will need to be capable of affording protection against explosions, fire and inertisation, both to withstand
an initial incident and be available to survivors, and to protect the "inmates" against subsequentevents.
The design parameters for refuge chambers therefore need to address:

•

supply of fresh air;

•

air-lock arrangements;

•

water and food supplies;

•

communication;

•

fire and explosion protection;

•

lighting; and

•

retrieval of personnel

An inspection regime for the overall system will be required to maintain all facilities in effective working condition.
Recovery strategies for personnel in a refuge chamber will be required :md needs to addressthe possibility of atmospheric
stabilisation by inertisation prior to mine-re-entry by rescue teams.
Personnel recovery can be envisaged in three main ways, these being;
.through
the mine to the entry points under relatively normal conditions, either accompanied or unassisted;
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•
•

through the mine to the entry points under breathing apparatllS and assisted by a rescue team on foot, or with a
manned vehicle or with a remotely controlled vehicle;
through a large diameter borehole directly to the surface.

Industry developments

-Australia

There are instances of refuge chambers in use in Australia, the most notable being the Capcoal Central example. This
chamber is a static chamber, built in a reasonably central proximity to a number of working areas and featuring a large
diameter borehole (mini vent shaft) in close proximity for emergency e!:ress.
The use of personal self-contained self rescuer breathing apparatus has recently become an imminent requirement in
Queensland, and this together with a "cache" system to provide activt:ly promoted for immediate usage in underground
coal mines.
A research submission

is currently

being considered

that if successfully

Further work is also planned in the area of inertisation, which
provides a strong inertisation capability for Australian mines.

funded win ultimately

deliver

a rescue vehicle.

with the recent purchase of the GAG 3 jet equipment,

An associated development in the Australian industry that is most pertinent to the overall safety of underground coal mines
is the adoption of standards applicable to all structural ventilation devices. These standards and the resultant improved
structures will enhance the possibility of personnel survival in the event of an explosion, such that the provision of postexplosion facilities may become more relevant.
It should be recognised that the adoption of refuge chambers and associated strategies is not an alternative to "escapeways"
but that the refuge chamber may also have some benefit in the instance of a major mine fIre.

MICROSEISMIC DETECTION SYSTEMS
Introduction
In the US, MSHA maintains a microseismic monitoring facility which can be deployed on the surface, and .can locate
signals generated by miners striking the roof and floor of the mine. There is also a portable system which could be taken
into emergency zones to help locate people or significant events. These form part of the emergency response facilities of
MSHA. The MSHA surface system is described and the potential for application of microseismic emergency monitoring
in Australia is discussed.

The MSHA seismic location system
A seismic location system was developed by the USBM in the early 1980s to locate workers trapped underground. A
truck with geophysical monitoring equipment was assembled, and a standardised routine for trapped workers devised.
The deployment procedures and elements in the system are:

1. A b"uck with geophone arrays and recording equipment is deployed on the surface above a mine where workers are
trapped. Up to seven arrays are used and the geophones located with GPS.
2. Trapped workers are notified that the monitoring system is in place by firing three explosive charges.
3. Signals are then generated by trapped workers striking the roof amd floor of the mine 10 times in succession. If no
response is received from the surface, the 10 blows are to be repeated every 15 minutes.
4. When a signal from the miners is received at the surface, and the source located, 5 shots are fired to indicated to the
underground workers that their signals have been received and l:hat they are located.
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Experimental systems were reported by Shope et al (1982) and it was claimed the system was effective to 600m. An
operational unit is maintained in a state of readiness by the Mine Safety and Health Administration at Pittsburgh Research
Centre, Brucetown. It is reported that the current system can detect sig:nalsat a range of 45Om and can locate the signal
source to within 30m. The unit is tested in field trials 3 times a year.
Miners are issued with a hat sticker by MSHA which describes the prolcedures to follow if they find themselves trapped
underground.
Although the MSHA system is directed to the precise location of trapped workers underground, it also perfomls an
extremely important function of confIrming that trapped workers are alive. This is of great value to the rescue operation
even if their precise locatity cannot be detemlined.

MICROSEISMIC

APPLICATION

JFORAUSTRALIA

Surface systems
The MSHA equipment is entirely surface based. The technique detects the characteristic signal made by the miner's blows
in the mine, and locates the signal source by triangulation of the wave paths detected by arrays on the surface. This
utilises source location routines commonly used in seismology. Arrays of geophones are used to reduce extraneous
surface seismic sources,so the signal initiated by the underground miners is enhanced. A surface system does not require
any prior development of infrastructure by the mine site.
Requirements for an effective surface system include:
Access to the surface
This can be restricted by rugged terrain, cultural developments or overlying water bodies
Propagation of signals
An essential requirement for an effective surface system is that the underground signals must propagate to the surface.
The American experience indicates that signals can be detected up to 45()m in some strata conditions. Strata may attenuate
or divert signals so they cannot reach the surface. Microseismic experiments in Australian mines have encountered
difficulties monitoring signals from depth, and causal factors include

•

source too deep;

•

strata structurally disrupted;

•

layered high and low velocity beds;

.

rapid signal attenuation in goaf and gassy units; and

•

overlying Tertiary and Quaternary sediments and volcanics.

From the Australian experience 45Om detection distances is expected to represent the best possible performance, and this
would only be in the most favourable circumstances. Areas with thick Tertiary and Quaternary sediments at the surface
would prevent any surface detection of signals from working depths.
Potential conditions affecting signal detection in Australia coalfields include:
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Southern coalfield

Western Coalfield

Negatives

Positives

Mines generally too deep
Surface access

Solid rock

Surface

Solid rock
Some shallower workings

access

Newcastle

Surface access
Strong and weak layers

Some

Hunter Valley

Localised surficial deposits

Access generally good
Shallower workings

Bowen Basin

Extensive surficial deposits

Shallower workings
Access generally good

shallower

workings

An analysis on a mine by mine basis would show that some location:s potentially have excellent conditions for surface
detection, and others are unlikely to be successful sites at the depths of current mining.

Deployable systems
A surface microseismic system would have to be maintained at the ready if it was to be used in emergencies. There would
have to be a standing capacity and emergency access to trained operators. This would logically be a shared industry
facility rather than the responsibility of any operator. The microsei:smic techniques and equipment required are well
known and a number of Australian consultants and agencies could provide the technical requirements.
Borehole systems
Some of the difficulties with surface systems in Australia could be ove:rcome by using geophones installed in boreholes.
These can be placed in competent rock near to the worked seams, to reduce propagation distances and to avoid wave paths
travelling through problem materials.
Many exploration boreboles are drilled around underground developments, and it would be simple and inexpensive to
install a geopbone during grouting of the boles. These geopbones could be used during emergencies.
The position of boreholes is based on other specific needs so it is unlikely that a mine would be able to set up a network
which would allow triangulation coverage of all underground areas. Most mines however, would get a coverage of
boreholes which would provide at least one monitoring point throug;hout the workings.
This would at least allow
conf1rInation that trapped workers were alive, and indicate that their loc:ition was within the detection area of the activated
geophone. If triangulation and location detection were not required, e;achborehole would need only a basic monitoring
device to record the geophone signals, so that any repeated seismic waves generated by the miners could be identified.
These units could be deployed along with other mine rescue service acti,{ities, and would not require specialised personnel.
Small portable microseismic systems
Small portable microseismic systems can be transported and operated iIJIany emergency situation. MSHA has such a unit
which has also been used at natural disasters such as earthquakes. These~units use well known technology and commercial
groups could either provide equipment or a service.
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Introducing the technologyin Australia
The lack of any local experience discourages the implementation of rnicroseismic technology for rescue operations in
Australia. This could be overcome by undertaking demonstrations of surface and borehole configurations by using
existing geophone installations and conventional seismic survey instrumc:ntation.
Success in these trials could lead on to the provision of seismic personal location service for emergencies, which could
include the following elements:

•

adoption of routine geophone installation in boreholes;

•

establishing local mine perfonnance;

•

training of workers to use the system; and

•

training and equipping of mines rescue services.

SUMMARY
Microseismic location from the surface, of underground miners hammering, is demonstrated by MSHA in the US, for
distances up to 450m at 30m accuracy.
Only a small proportion of Australian mines are believed to be aml~nable to surface detection methods because of
unfavourable accessproblems or geological conditions.
Mines with favourable conditions could do local tests, and there are a number of Australian groups with the technical
capability to advise mines.
Geophones installed in mine boreholes could provide a good coverage of most mines and provide a way to verify miners
were still alive, and their general location. A simple instrument would need to be developed to monitor the geophones,
and could be deployed by mine staff or mines rescue brigades.
Widespread take up by the Australian mining industry is dependent on successful demonstration of the technique.
References
SHOPE, S., DURKIN, J., and GREENFIELD R. 1982 Finding and coIDJnunication with trapped miners. Bureau of Mines
Information Circular / 1982 No 8907,49-78.
BANCROFf R., 1997 Overseas study tour to investigate self rescue systems and underground escape strategies.
Department of Mines and Energy Queensland Internal Report.

Large diameter drilling
Status report is currently being compiled an the current worldwide best practice (published Q1 1998)

Rescueemergencyvehicle
A large amount of effort and research development has gone into the fIrst concept machine called the NUMBA T over this
decade. Trials have been undertaken over the last 3 years at selected mines in New South Wales and Queensland. Allof
these trials have proved certain parts of the technology and directed other developments in line with current thinking in
mines rescue response from the industry .
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The current vehicle has proved that it is suitable in some instance for Emergency Response to determine environmental
conditions (gas monitoring, atmospheric conditions) with video response as a tool to provide a low risk technical
exploratory capability before rescue or recovery decisions are made.
During 1997 the changes in approach to rescue and recovery techniques defined shortfalls to our overall response, which
had relied largely on luck and hope.
The changes now focussed on a risk approach where we could control the conditions, accurately assess the environmental
changesand minimise the consequential damage to other persons.
Legislative changes in both NSW and Qld to the use of hazard management, Management Plans, self rescuers and systems,
self escape training and in Queensland the provision of (2) GAG engines for mine inertisation have changed our "Rescue"
response.
The provision of portable refuges fixed or and the probable inertisa1:ion of a mine to effectively minimise the risk of
uncontrolled explosions means that a rescue response vehicle needs to' be developed. Both NSW and Qld cross industry
groups are working together to develop a vehicle capable of high speed access with life support systems for up to 15
people that can operate in an inert atmosphere. Much of the original NUMBA T technology will be directly transferable
with the main focus on the cabin design, life support and engine systerl1s. This RandD project will be reported on later in
1998.

MINES RESCUE STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT
Introdut~tion incident management
The Underground

Mines Rescue Strategy Development

group selected a committee

and other criteria needed in an emergency to manage an incident.
Group 4 recommendations
15, 16, 17.

to look at the information,

The issues were related to the implementation

equipment
of Task

Capability to model ventilation and the mine environment following an incident
Integrated emergency preparedness guidelines for mine operators and emergency services, common to both Qld
andNSW
Development of computer-based emergency decision support system for incident management and training

15
16
17

The incident management sub-committee included:
Gibson
MRSNSW

(Chairman)

English
Garland
Gillies
Hendricks

QDME (Secretary)
QMC/North Goonyella
University of Qld
NSWMC/BHP Collieries

Hutchings
Stothard

QMRB
CFMEU

R15 Ventilation and environmental modelling
Ventilation modelling to include:

•
•

COAL98

modelling of post incident mine ventilation and atmosphere to be a required element of Mine Safety Management
Plans;
development of learned ventilation and fire control responses for different incident scenarios and locations, pre
determined for each mine, with plans prepared and personnel tJ'ainedin appropriate action plans.

Conference

Wollongong

18- 20 February

1998

753

•
•

determining the explosibility of aunospheres;
distillation profiles for the coal in each mine to be detennined a:l1dincorporated into models;
models to interface with standard mine planning packages and kept up to date;

R15 Progress Report
.

Survey of industry ventilation modelling;
Of 18 mines using MINVENT

17 operated by consultants;

mines using VENTSIM only 2 use consultants;

Of
5 other

mines

use 3 other

modelling

systems;

10 (smaller) mines currently do not model; and
No contact/responsesfrom 9 mines

•

VENTSIM
Windows based system designed and supported in Australia; and
User friendly, favoured by experienced mine ventilation engineers.

•

MINVENT
Currently favoured by consultants, perhaps becauseof better printing facilities; and
Limited support available.

•

Post-Incident ventilation/environmental monitoring

•

Two post-incident ventilation/environmental monitoring systems idt:ntified
M-FIRE, developed by MSHA for simulation of mine fifes; and
POZAR, developed by Polish Ventilation Academy to enable mines to simulate mine fire effects in multiface/seam mines and evaluate intervention strategies.

• M-FIRE
Public domain software, limited adoption and development, only validated once

•

POZAR
Routinely adopted by Polish mines. intervention evaluations accepted by Polish authorities;
Trialed at Collinsville, and to undergo further evaluation at North Goonyella; and
Current marketing
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R15 -Selection Matrix for Industry system

•

User friendly (Windows based);

.

Capable of being broadly adopted as industry standard;

•

Acceptable to new generation Ventilation Officer;

•

Integrate with mine planning/survey systems;

•

Capable of modelling dynamic situations; and

•

Capable of integrating

R15 -Recommendations

real time P, Q, and T data.

Being Considered

•

Support concept of statutory Ventilation Officer and development of appropriate competencies

•

Competencies to include ventilation modelling in static and dynamic post-incident applications

•

User friendly ventilation software should be adopted as industry standard

•

Develop capability

to integrate real time P, Q, T

Develop integrated industry network and expert system for post-incident monitoring and evaluation

R16 emergencypreparednessGuidelines
Guidelines should address:
.Roles

and responsibilities

.Consolidation

of mine management and emergency services in an emergency;

and

and integration of emergency response procedures developed through principal

hazard

management plans
Development of a common
in Qld and NSW

training

program as a joint pre-requisite

for mine managers and undermanagers

accreditation

Development, maintenance and assessmentof appropriate competencies.
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R16 prol~ress

•

report

MRBNSW has developed Guidelines for mines rescue organisations and personnel, currently being evaluated by
QMRS

Sub-Committee to develop Guidelines for operators, with initial draft due end-November 1997

R 17 computer-based
.Incident

emergency

Management

decision

support

system

enhanced by decision support system that:

•

provides strategic information on the mine and the incident;

•

provides an analysis of the developing situation;

•

presents prioritised options available; and

•

provides training system.

R17 PROGRESS REPORT
•

ECAS system developed by ACIRL under NERDDC funding in 1989-90 requires significant enhancement
and more user friendly platform;
-

•

Literature search underway to identify other possible systems; and

•

Systems utilised by armed forces and emergency services to be investigated

CSIRO trial of Virtual Reality Modelling System including mine emerge:ncyapplications supported
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